The Role of Tribes in the Release of IS Combatants in Northeast Syria
Examines the tribal sponsorship system that led to nearly half of all releases between May 2019 and December 2020.
Case Details
Type: Article
Year: 2022
Themes: Tribal Governance, Reintegration, ISIL
Region: Northeast Syria (Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor)
Status: Read full article
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The Story
Between May 2019 and December 2020, the SDF released 7,500–8,000 Syrian Islamic State combatants and their families from camps in Northeast Syria. Roughly half of those releases ran through informal tribal sponsorship — a system that has shaped the trajectory of reintegration in Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor in ways that are little understood beyond the region.
This article — the second in a three-part MECS series — sets out how tribal sponsorship works in practice, the criteria that determined eligibility for release, and where the process diverged between Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor in design, accountability and community confidence.
What MECS Did
MECS polled 800 participants in late 2020 — half former IS combatants and their families, half host community members. 42% of the former combatants and families polled indicated having been released as a result of a tribal sponsorship scheme, providing the largest sample yet of how the system functioned at household level.
Eligibility for release required combatants to have voluntarily surrendered to SDF and the International Coalition, with no record of crimes (‘hands not stained with blood’). Local tribal figures could then offer to sponsor a release; the negotiations involved tribal leaders, SDF and the Coalition jointly. Each application required information on biodata, prior occupation, role during IS involvement, and several individual sponsors.
Process design diverged significantly between governorates. In Deir-ez-Zor, evaluations concluded with court-issued release orders followed by sworn statements signed by the released individuals, their relatives and tribal sponsors — who were thereafter held accountable. In Raqqa, families could petition tribal leaders directly, who then ran their own background checks before consulting SDF leadership.
The Results
That difference in design translated into different community confidence: 79.5% of Deir-ez-Zor respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the sponsorship deals were ‘good for society’, against 59% in Raqqa. The Raqqa gap was attributed to insufficiently rigorous background checks and the perceived release of figures considered dangerous due to past affiliations.